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NOTES AND COMMENTS

likewise has not only the cost of removal but also the cost of moving
back to complete the term of the lease. Often the lessee has the right
to renewal or an option to renew on a favorable lease. The only method
available to the tenant to lessen this expense would be to sublet the
remaining part of the term, or in the case of renewal, to give up this
profitable right.
In the instant case the Government deprived the General Motors
Corporation not only of its space, but also required the removal of
fixtures and a stock of goods much of which was demolished because
it could not be moved. It cannot be argued logically that the Government did not "take" this property. The defendant was deprived of the
space and of the use of that space and was put to considerable expense.
The demolition and removal expense were no criteria of the value of
the space condemned, but they were definite criteria of the value of the
use to which that space had been put.
The decision in this case opened a pathway through the old test of
using the fair market value of the bare realty confiscated. Perhaps it
points the way to a standard of evaluation in which the owner or lessee
will actually be put in as good position pecuniarily as he would have
occupied if his property had not been taken. The result is a realistic
approach to this problem.4*
IDRIENNE

E. LEvY.

Torts-Liability of Parent for Torts of ChildDangerous Weapons
What is the liability of a parent for torts committed by a child with
a gun given by the parent? The question was raised in a recent West
this amended petition has any bearing upon the issues before the court below or

here."
4

*Two decisions handed .down by District Judge Yankwich since this note
was originally written have refused to allow the cost of removal to be considered.

One of these, United States v. Certain Parcels of Land, 54 Fed. Supp. 561 (S. D.

Cal. 1944) was decided 8 days after the General Motors Case and without reerence to it. The other, United States v. 0.64 Acres of Land, 54 Fed. Supp.
562- (S. D. Cal. 1944) a month later, noted the decision handed down by the
Circuit Court of Appeals, 7th Circuit, but refused to follow it and approved the
views of the dissenting judge . . . that if the owner of the fee was not entitled
to cost .of removal, there could be no reason for allowing it to the tenant in a
leasehold interest. This entirely overlooks the distinctions just noted above and
the special hardship present in the cases where less than the condemnee's full
term is taken. At page 563 District Judge Yankwich made this observation:
"Had a principle of law which would allow relocation cost when the owner
occupies the premises and deny it when a tenant occupies them would establish
a criterion of differentiation would has no reasonable foundation in fact." Aside
from the difficulties of sentence structure it might be said of this statement that
it has no foundation in the cases. It is conceded that the owner of a freehold
has been denied this element of compensation, for the most part, but that the
leasehold tenant has been given special consideration. There has not been found
any line of authority which would approve of allowing cost of removal to the
owner of the fee and denying it to the tenant under the leasehold interest.
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Virginia case1 in which the complaint alleged that the defendant parents
gave their four-year-old son an air rifle, knowing by reason of his infancy that he was incapable of the use of judgment, care, and discretion in the use of an air rifle; and, knowing that the air rifle was
a dangerous instrumentality permitted him to have it under his control;
and that the infant carelessly discharged a shot which destroyed the
vision of the plaintiff's eye. The defendant demurred on the ground
that the declaration did not allege any negligent misconduct on the
defendant's part proximately causing plaintiff's injuries. The court
held that an air rifle was not inherently dangerous, but the complaint
alleged sufficient facts without minute circumstances constituting evidence which was sufficient for overruling the demurrer.
It is well settled under common law that a parent is liable for the
torts of his child only on such grounds as would make him liable for
the torts of any other person.2 The mere relationship of parent and
child is not sufficient to hold the parent liable for torts committed by
his child3 in the absence of statute to the contrary; rather infants are
4
liable for torts committed the same as are adults.
Where a child has committed a tort with a gun, the gist of the
parent's liability is upon agency or employmentS* or upon his own
negligence in permitting his incapable minor child to have the gun, or
access to one, whereby the damage proximately resulted.
A dangerous weapon is one likely to produce death or great bodily
harm. 6 Although a gun is a dangerous weapon under some circumstances, mere possession or use is not per se unlawful.7 Therefore a
parent is not negligent for simply putting a firearm in the hands of an
'Mazzocchi v. Seay, W. Va. -,
29 S. E. (2d) 12 (1944).
21 CooLFY, TORTs (3rd ed. 1906) 180; NoTE (1941) N. C. L. Rwv. 605.
* Palm v. Ivorson, 117 Ill. App. 535 (1905); Basset v. Riley, 131 Mo. App.
721, 111 S. W. 596 (1908); Brittingham v. Stadiem, 151 N. C. 299, 66 S. E. 128

(1909).

'Wilson v. Garrard, 59 Ill. 51 (1874); Paul v. Hummel, 43 Mo. 119, 97 Am.
Dec. 381 (1888).
'The general rules of agency apply in such a case. In the case of Figone
v. Gui sti, 43 Cal. App. 606, 185 Pac. 694 (1919) the defendant hired his minor
son to work in a saloon. In response to a threat of a patron to shanghai him,
the minor discharged a pistol, kept in case of robbery, killing the patron. A
California court held the master parent not liable for the results, since they
arose out of a private quarrel and were not within the scope of the employment.
In Winkler v. Fisher, 95 Wis. 355, 70 N. W. 477 (1897) the Wisconsin court
held a minor son who had been directed to kill crows in a corn field, but who
had gone two miles away to hunt squirrels, not to be within the scope of the
employment, thereby releasing the parent from liability.
However the parent is liable for torts committed within the scope of the employment. Carmouche v. Bovis, 6 La. Ann. 95, 54 Am. Dec. 558 (1851) ; Dixon
v. Bell, 5 Maule & Sel. 198, 105 Eng. Rep. 1023 (1816) ; Brittingham v. Stadiem,
151 N. C. 299. 66 S. E. 128 (1909).
'Parman v. Lemmon, 120 Kan. 370, 244 Pac. 227 (1926).
1 Clarine v. Addison, 182 Minn. 310, 234 N. W. 295 (1931).
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infant son.8 It is generally held that a BB gun (air rifle) is not a
dangerous weapon and does not belong to any branch of the weapon
family.'*
The negligence of the parent is divided into two general fields:
(1) Where the parent negligently places a weapon where an incompetent child can get it, and (2) where the parent is negligent in permitting an incapable infant to possess or use a firearm.
A parent is negligent when he places a loaded gun where an infant
child can reach it, provided that a prudent man would have perceived
danger, though not necessarily the specific harm. 1° * One case approaches the imposition of absolute liability on the parent. 1' The parent
had broken the stock from the gun and had thrown both stock and
barrel under the bed. He had ordered the son not to bother the gun
and did not know the son had it. A Rhode Island court affirmed a
charge to the jury which would hold a parent liable if the jury found
the parent negligent in leaving the gun where the son would find it
and use it; and the son was of insufficient age and experience to be
trusted with the weapon.
In order to hold the parent negligent in permitting an infant child
to have or use a gun, the following requisites must be shown:
1. The child must have been careless in the past or was of such
tender years as would be indicative of his being incapable to handle a
dangerous weapon. Generally it is not age but experience which determines whether the parent could have foreseen possible harm.12 *
' Wood v. O'Neill, 90 Conn. 497, 97 Ati. 753 (1916); Clarine v. Addison, 182
Minn. 310, 234 N. W. 295 (1931).
o, Capps v. Carpentar, 129 Kan. 462, 283 Pac. 655 (1930). But see Archibald
v. Jewell, 70 Pa. Sup. Ct. 247 (1918) where the court was unable to say as a
matter of law that an irresponsible boy with the full knowledge of his father
may possess and use as an innocent toy a device loaded with 50 BB shot, capable
of being discharged with such force as to destroy the eye of a human being at
a distance of 50 feet.
10* Sullivan v. Creed, [1904] 2K. B. 317 (Parent left gun inside the stile of
his own land, next to a path leading from a public road to his cottage.) ; Sojka
v. Dlugosz, 293 Mass. 419, 200 N. E. 554 (1936) (Parent left gun and cartridges
on pantry shelf without any instruction to the child as to the use thereof.) ; Phillips v. Barnett, 2 N. Y. City Ct. Rep. 20 (1889) (Parent left loaded revolver
in an unlocked bureau drawer. The court held the father liable on the ground
that he was negligent in keeping such a dangerous weapon within reach of the
child.) But see Swanson v. Crandall, 2 Pa. Sup. Ct. 85 (1896) (Parent left a
loaded revolver in the upper drawer of a chiffonier used exclusively by him in
his bedroom. The Pennsylvania court held the father not to be negligent when
his five-year-old daughter found the gun and fired it, injuring the plaintiff. The
shooting of the revolver was not the natural and probable consequence and could
not be anticipated as the usual and natural result. Hence the keeping of the
loaded revolver was not the proximate cause of the accident.)
In Frellesen v. Colburn, 156 Misc. 254, 281 N. Y. Supp. 471 (1935) the father
separated the shells and gun. There was no-evidence that the father had any
knowledge that his son had ever used the gun before. When the son shot a dog,
the parent was held to be free from negligence under the circumstances.
" Salisbury v. Crudale, 41 R. I. 33, 102 Ati. 731 (1918).
14 Palm v. Ivorson, 117 Ill. App. 535 (1905) (Parent was not negligent where
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2. The parent must have been notified that the child was careless,
negligent, or reckless. It is immaterial whether such knowledge
was
derived from seeing his child's act of negligence or from being
informed
of them by others.13* The fact that the father is momentarily
absent
from the house at the time of the shooting does not suffice
either to
exempt him from responsibility or to transfer it to the mother
who is
14
present. *
3. The parent, having a knowledge of the carelessness,
negligence,
and recklessness must have made it possible for the child
to do the
mischief. It is essential that the parent be able to foresee
the negligence of the child.15* Thus it is held that a parent cannot
reasonably
foresee that his child will lend it to a third party who will commit
a tort
upon the plaintiff.'"* When a child discharges the gun, and
for some
the 12-year-old child was a thoroughly experienced marksman.);
Turner v.
Snider, 16 Manitoba Rep. 79 (1907) (Defendant's 14-year-old
son was carefully
trained m the use of a gun and ordinarily used great
skill in handling it under
such circumstances that the father was justified in assuming
reasonable care. When the son negligently discharged his that he would use
gun, setting fire to
the prairie grass, the parent was not liable.) ; Herndobler
146 Pac. 140 (1915) (Defendant's son had owned and usedv. Rippen, 75 Ore. 22,
a rifle since he was
nine years old. Through his negligence he shot the plaintiff.
The defendant
was 3not liable.).
t *Gudiewski v. Stemplesky, 263 Mass. 103, 160 N. E.
334 (1914) (Evidence
that the mother had seen the son shopting in yard and vicinity
was held admissible to show that the parents knew of their with an air rifle
gence.); Kuchlick v. Feuer, 239 App. Div. 338, 268 N. Y. minor son's negliSupp. 256 (1933)
(Son had been shooting at street
The parent knew or "should have
known."); Johnson v. Glidden, 11 S.lamps.
D. 237, 76 N. W. 933, 74 Am. St. Rep. 933
(1898) (On previous occasions the son had called
people abusive names and frequently discharged firearms at passers-by in the presence of
son v. Nokes, 60 Wis. 511, 19 N. W. 382, 50 Am. Rep. 381 the parent.) ; Havertwo sons had fired at Plaintiff's horses, frightening them, (1884) (Defendant's
on previous occasions
in the defendant's presence.) ; cf. Whitesides
Wheeler, 158 Ky. 121, 164 S. W.
335 (1914) (The court refused evidence to v.prove
that others thought the defendant's son was insane. Nothing but overt acts of violence
are competent on
this issue, and even such overt acts must be within the
fendant to make him liable.); Basset v. Riley, 130 Mo. knowledge of the deApp.
596 (1908) (Defendant's 17-year-old son stepped out the door, 721, 111 S. W.
telling his father
that he was going to scare a dog. The parent was
not liable for the accidental
shooting of the dog by the son because the parent had
no
way to know that the
son's intention was toijious.). Ritter v. Thibordeaux, 41 S.
1897) (A father who does not permit his minor son to use W. 492 (Tex. App.,
sible in damages for the tort of his son, who purposely anda gun is not responcarelessly shoots a
companion while on a hunting trip made without
the father's knowledge.).
"'*Mullins v. Blaise, 37 La. Ann. 92 (1886) ; but
see Charton v. Jackson, 183
Mo. App. 613, 167 S. W. 670 (1914) (Mother
well as father is liable in permitting the child to use the firearm, where in as
the father's absence, she fails to
exercise the authority devolving upon her.).
'5* Meers v. McDowell, 110 Ky.
926, 62 S.
1013 (1901) (Defendant plied
his minor son of weak and undeveloped mind W.
with liquors, and while the son
was under the influence thereof, permitted the son
to have a loaded rifle with
which the son subsequently shot the plaintiff.).
1 *Harris v. Cameron, 81 Wis. 239, 51 N. W. 437 (1892)
(By implication
the purchase of the gun by the parent was not the
cause, and he could
not reasonably foresee such an act.) ; cf. Chaddock proximate
v. Plummer, 88 Mich. 225, 50
N. W. 135, 14 L. R. A. 675 (1892).
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undisclosed reason a match is expelled, injuring the plaintiff, the purchase of the gun is not the proximate cause; and the parent is not
liable.' 7 But if the parent knows that his child is using a firearm in a
careless and negligent manner, it is his parental duty to interpose and
prevent a course of conduct on the part of the child which is likely to
produce injury to others.s* If the minor child is suspended, even
temporarily, from the parental authority and subjected to the authprity
of another, the parent is not liable.lO*
4. The child must have inflicted injury upon the plaintiff from
which the plaintiff could have recovered from the child. It is obligatory on the plaintiff that he must not contribute to his own negligence.
20
All defenses that the child may have had are available to the parent. *
Where the child has committed a tort, and the parent subsequently
promises to pay for the damage done, the parent is not liable for breach
of contract if he later refuses to pay. Such a promise is made without
consideration, and no valid contract is created. 21
Under Louisiana statutes 22 the parent is liable for torts committed
by unemancipated children. The courts of that state have held the
parent liable for injuries resulting from such acts, intentional or careless, on the part of the child.P Georgia, by statute, 24 holds the parent
liable for the tort of his child "committed at the parent's command, or
in the persecution and within the scope of his business." In a case
under this statute the parent is liable if the child acts as the parent's
servant or agent.25
Thus under pleadings the plaintiff in the Mazzocchi Case, supra,
has stated a good cause of action.
CECIL J. HILL.
"Fleming v. Kravitz, 260 Pa. 428, 103 AtI. 831 (1918).
(B*
Johnston v. Gliddven, 11 S.D. 237, 76 N. W. 933, 74 Am. St. Rep. 933
(1898) ; cotra, Hagerty v. Powers, 66 Cal. 368, 5 Pac. 622 (1885) (Case based
upon precedent alone, and no case having been cited which held a parent liable,
the court held for the defendant.).
Sn* Coats v. Roberts, 35 La. Ann. 891 (1883) (The minor son was lawfully
summoned by the sheriff to serve on a posse and while engaged negligently shot
another member.).

"0*Miller v. Meche, 111 La. 143, 35 So. 491 (1903) (Plaintiff was the aggressor in the affray.) ; Moran v. Burroughs; 27 Ont. L. Rep. 539, 10 D. L. R.
181 (1912) (Doctrine of contributory negligence applied.).
'Baker v. Morris, 33 Kan. 580, 7 Pact 267 (1885).
" LA. Civ. CODE ANN.

(Dart, 1932) §§2315-2318; NoTE (1932) TXLANE L. R.

119; NorE (1934) CoaR.. L. Q. 643.
"Wright v. Petty, 7 La. App. 584 (1927); Sutton v. Champagne, 141 La.
470, 75 So. 209 (1917) ; Marrioneaux v. Brugier, 35 La. Ann. 13 (1883).

" Chastain v.(1933)
Johns,§105-108.
160 Ga. 977, 48 S. E. 343 (1904).

:'GA. CODE

